Surveying Residential Burglaries: A Case Study of Local Crime
  Measurement by Brame, Robert et al.
Surveying Residential Burglaries: A Case
Study of Local Crime Measurement
Robert Brame & Michael G. Turner
University of North Carolina at Charlotte
Raymond Paternoster
University of Maryland
January 2013
Abstract
We consider the problem of estimating the incidence of residential
burglaries that occur over a well-defined period of time within the 10
most populous cities in North Carolina. Our analysis typifies some of
the general issues that arise in estimating and comparing local crime
rates over time and for different cities. Typically, the only informa-
tion we have about crime incidence within any particular city is what
that city’s police department tells us, and the police can only count
and describe the crimes that come to their attention. To address this,
our study combines information from police-based residential burglary
counts and the National Crime Victimization Survey to obtain interval
estimates of residential burglary incidence at the local level. We use
those estimates as a basis for commenting on the fragility of between-
city and over-time comparisons that often appear in both public dis-
course about crime patterns.
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1 Introduction
It is difficult to count the incidence of crime at the local level. Typically, the
only systematically collected crime data are those compiled by the local police
department for submission to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI)
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program. These numbers are best suited
for tracking the amount of crime that is reported to the police and how often
these reported crimes are cleared by arrest or exceptional means (FBI, 2009).
However, they often carry considerable weight in assessing how well a police
department is performing, how safe a community is, and whether a police
department needs more or different kinds of resources (Maltz, 1999:2). News
media and law enforcement agencies routinely report levels and trends in
crimes known to the police as “crimes” and “criminal behavior.” In prepared
testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, Carbon (2012:16) writes
that “[t]he UCR is the national ‘report card’ on serious crime; what gets
reported through the UCR is how we, collectively view crime in this country.”
Sometimes, these assessments veer into explicit crime rate rankings of cities
(Rosenfeld and Lauritsen [2008] discusses the scope of this problem) – a
practice that has been condemned by the American Society of Criminology
(2007). Criminologists sometimes use and compare point estimates of crime
rates for different jurisdications at various levels of aggregation, and they
report relationships between crime and various social and economic indicators
as if there was no uncertainty in those estimates beyond sampling variation.1
In our view, there is no inherent problem with considering whether a crime
rate is higher in one place than another at the same time or whether a crime
rate is higher at one time than another in the same place. To be absolutely
clear, the problem arises when ambiguities in the statistics undermine the
validity of the comparison.
For example, a major obstacle to using police-based crime statistics to
infer within-community changes in crime over time or between-community
crime differences arises from the well-known fact that many crimes are not
reported to the police (Baumer and Lauritsen, 2010; James and Council,
2008). Therefore, when crime rates vary across space or time, it is hard to
1Such comparisons arise in fixed-effect regressions or difference-in-difference estimators
that attempt to statistically relate changes in police-based crime statistics to changes in
other variables that vary over time. A theme of this paper is that the problem is greater
than the usual concerns about random measurement error in the outcome variable. In
fact, we believe there is no basis for assuming random measurement error in this context.
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know how much of that change is caused by shifts in real criminal behavior
or changes in the reporting behavior of victims (Biderman and Reiss, 1967;
Maltz, 1975; Eck and Riccio, 1979; Blumstein et al., 1991, 1992; also for a
similar idea in state SAT rankings see Wainer, 1986).
Consider a simple anecdote that illustrates our concerns. A recent news-
paper article in the Charlotte Observer reported that “the number of crimes
dropped 7.1 percent last year, a development that Charlotte Police Chief
Rodney Monroe credited largely to officers keeping a close eye on potential
criminals before they struck” (Lyttle, 2012). The comparison expressed in
this news coverage implicitly makes the strong and untestable assumption
that the reporting behavior of victims stayed the same and all of the change
in the number of crimes known to the police from one year to the next is
due to changes in criminal behavior (Eck and Riccio, 1979; Blumstein et al.,
1991; Brier and Fienberg, 1980; Nelson, 1979; Skogan, 1974; Rosenfeld and
Lauritsen, 2008; Bialik, 2010).
Analytically, the same problems exist when criminologists try to explain
variation in crime rates across different cities with identified explanatory
variables like police patrol practices, dropout rates, home foreclosures, and
unemployment; they also arise when researchers try to measure and explain
short-term changes in crime rates within the same jurisdiction. Whether
the analysis involves simple year-over-year percent change comparisons for
different cities or more complex statistical models for cross-sectional and
panel data sets, the analytical ambiguities are the same.
In fact, variation in crime reporting patterns injects considerable ambi-
guity into the interpretation of police-based crime statistics (Eck and Riccio,
1979; Blumstein et al., 1991; Levitt, 1998). Recent work by Baumer and Lau-
ritsen (2010) – building on a long series of detailed crime reporting statistics
from the National Crime Survey (NCS) and its successor, the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS) – makes the compelling point that there may
be a causal relationship between the mobilization of the police and the likeli-
hood that a community’s citizens will report victimization experiences to the
police. Police departments that cultivate strong working community partner-
ships may actually increase reporting of certain crimes simply because people
believe the police will take useful actions when those crimes are reported:
Police notification rates are indicators of public confidence in the
police and the legitimacy of the criminal justice system, and in-
creasing police-public communication is a key goal of community-
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oriented policing strategies to reduce crime and the fear of crime
(Baumer and Lauritsen, 2010:132).
Even changes in the number of police in a particular area may affect crime
reporting practices of the citizenry (Levitt, 1998). Variation in reporting
rates can create the illusion of a shift in crime even if real crime levels are
perfectly stable (Eck and Riccio, 1979; Maltz, 1975). In fact, residential
burglary reporting rates do exhibit year-to-year volatility. From 2010 to
2011, the rate at which residential burglary victimizations were reported to
the police dropped from 59% to 52% (Truman, 2011:10; Truman and Planty,
2012:9). If these kinds of changes occur at the local level as well, they could
easily explain a good deal of the variation we typically see from one year to
the next in local, police-based robbery and burglary statistics.
In this paper, we conduct a case study of local level crime measurement
while trying to pay close attention to some important sources of ambiguity.
Specifically, our objective is to estimate the incidence of residential burglary
for each of the 10 most populous cities in North Carolina in 2009, 2010,
and 2011. The analysis is informed by data measuring the likelihood that
residential burglary victimizations are reported to the police. We focus on
residential burglaries in the 10 largest North Carolina cities because: (1)
residential burglary is a clear, well-defined crime about which the public
expresses considerable fear and concern (Blumstein and Rosenfeld, 2008:18-
20); (2) unlike most other states, North Carolina law enforcement agencies
publicly report residential burglaries known to the police separately from
non-residential burglary; (3) residential burglaries are household-level vic-
timizations which correspond closely to the household-level structure of the
NCVS (the NCVS does not measure reporting behaviors for commercial bur-
glaries); and (4) conducting the analysis across cities and over time allows us
to comment directly on the kinds of comparisons that are often conducted
with police-based crime statistics.
We are not the first to consider this issue (see, for example, Maltz, 1975;
Eck and Riccio, 1979; Blumstein et al., 1991; Levitt, 1998; Lohr and Prasad,
2003; Westat, 2010; Raghunathan et al., 2007). Nonetheless, the interval
estimates or bounds we propose in this paper consider several key sources of
uncertainty and stand in contrast to the excessively definitive point estimates
that are often the subject of public discourse about crime.
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2 Legal Cynicism and Crime Statistics
The first issue to address is why would we expect different rates of report-
ing crimes to the police in different jurisdictions (cities, counties, states)?2
Since most police work is reactive rather than proactive, questions about the
relationship between public perceptions of the police and the propensity of
citizens to report crime victimizations to the police loom large. If the public
perceives the police as indifferent and unlikely to do anything to help, the
likelihood of crimes being reported to the police could be affected (Baumer
and Lauritsen, 2010). Concerns that the police are unresponsive to the needs
of the community can lead to a phenomenon called “legal cynicism.”
Kirk and colleagues (Kirk and Matsuda 2011:444; Kirk and Papachris-
tos 2011) have argued that legal cynicism is a “cultural frame in which the
law and the agents of its enforcement are viewed as illegitimate, unrespon-
sive, and ill equipped to ensure public safety.” In addition, legal cynicism
is understood to be “an emergent property of neighborhoods in contrast to
a property solely of individuals” in part because it is formed not only in
reaction to one’s own personal experiences with legal actors and institutions
but through interaction with others in the community (Kirk and Matsuda
2011:448). According to this view, culture, and legal cynicism as part of it, is
not perceived as a set of values, goals, or “things worth striving for” (Merton
1968:187) but rather as a repertoire or toolkit to use in understanding the
world (Swidler 1986).
There are two consequences that follow from the level of legal cynicism in
a community. First, if legal institutions like the police are perceived as illegit-
imate then citizens are less willing to comply with laws with the result that
there is going to be more actual crime. For example, Fagan and Tyler (2005)
found that adolescents who perceived a lack of procedural justice among
2While our intention is not to offer an empirical test of the legal cynicism hypothesis or
a definitive answer to the question regarding variablility in reporting to the police across
jurisdictions, we do think that: (1) we owe the reader a plausible reason as to why this
issue might matter, and (2) we think that at least part of the variation in reporting a
crime to the police is due to differences in citizens’ lack of confidence in the police – part
of what is thought of as legal cynicism.
5
authorities also exhibited higher levels of legal cynicism.3 Adolescents rated
higher in legal cynicism (i.e., expressing agreement with statements like “laws
are made to be broken”) were also higher in self-reported delinquency than
those less cynical. In a survey of adult respondents, Reisig, Wolfe, and Holt-
freter (2011) reported that self-reported criminal offending was significantly
related to their measure of legal cynicism net of other controls including self-
control. Finally, Kirk and Papachristos (2011) found that legal cynicism in
Chicago neighborhoods explained why they had persistently high levels of
homicide in spite of declines in both poverty and general violence. In addi-
tion to these studies of legal cynicism, there are numerous studies which have
shown a link between measures of legitimacy of legal institutions such as the
courts and police and a higher probability of violating the law (Paternoster
et al. 1997; Tyler 2006; Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan 2011).
A second consequence of legal cynicism – of central concern in this paper –
is that citizens are not likely to cooperate with the police, including reporting
a crime when it occurs. When citizens believe that the police are not likely to
be responsive or will do little to help people like them, then we would expect
more crimes to go unreported and offenders to go unarrested. The perception
that it would do no good to cooperate with the police is an integral part of
the cultural system described by Anderson (1999:323) as the “code of the
street”:
[t]he most public manifestation of this alienation is the code of
the street, a kind of adaptation to a lost sense of security of the
local inner-city neighborhood and, by extension, a profound lack
of faith in the police and judicial system.
Several studies have found that community members – both adults and ju-
veniles – are unlikely to cooperate with the police, including reporting crime
3Fagan and Tyler’s operational definition of legal cynicism follows the original by Samp-
son and Bartusch (1998) which was conceptualized as a general sense of moral normlessness
or a lack of respect for society’s rules. Examples of items include “laws are made to be
broken” and “to make money, there are no right or wrong ways anymore, only easy ways
and hard ways.” In contrast, Kirk and colleagues focused more narrowly on the legal
dimension of cynicism, in which people perceive the law, and the police in particular,
as illegitimate, unresponsive and ill equipped to ensure public safety (Kirk and Matsuda
2011:447). Examples of items include, “the police are not doing a good job in preventing
crime in this neighborhood” and “the police are not able to maintain order on the streets
and sidewalks in the neighborhood.”
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and providing information, when law enforcement is seen as illegitimate (Sun-
shine and Tyler 2003; Tyler and Fagan 2008; Slocum et al. 2010). Kirk and
Matsuda (2011) found a lower risk of arrest in neighborhoods with high levels
of legal cynicism.
In sum, an increasing array of conceptual and empirical work has linked
a perceived lack of responsiveness on the part of legal actors to both more
crime and less reporting of crime. Communities characterized by high levels
of legal cynicism or a sudden change in the level of legal cynicism (because
of perceived mishandling of an event) may exhibit not only a higher level
of crime but also a greater unwillingness of citizens to report a crime to
the police. Given the reactive nature of most police work, there are sound
reasons for believing that citizens’ lack of cooperation and faith in the police
are reflected in a lower rate of official police-based crime statistics though
the actual rate may be higher. Although legal cynicism accounts for some of
the variation in the rate at which citizens’ report a crime to the police, other
factors are also involved. The point here is not to offer legal cynicism as the
only hypothesis or even test this conjecture as a hypotheseis. Rather, it is to
provide some justification that there are credible a priori reasons to believe
there is systematic variation in the reporting of crimes across jurisdictions
(and over time within the same jurisdiction) and that such variation is one
source of the ambiguity in police statistics. In the following sections, we
give formal expression to this ambiguity using an approach which brings the
fragile nature of police-based crime statistics to center stage.
3 Police-Reported Residential Burglaries
We begin our analysis by examining the number of residential burglaries re-
ported by the police to the North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation’s
(SBI) 2010 Uniform Crime Reports for the 10 most populous city-level ju-
risdictions in North Carolina during the 2009-2011 period (State Bureau of
Investigation, 2012). The SBI statistics count both attempted and completed
residential burglaries. We verified that each of these 10 cities participated
in the SBI’s UCR program for each month of the 2009-2011 calendar years.
Table 1 identifies the 10 cities included in our study (column 1) along with
the frequency of residential burglaries reported by each city’s police depart-
ment in 2009 (column 2), 2010 (column 3), and 2011 (column 4). We denote
residential burglaries reported by the police to the SBI-UCR program as bp.
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Table 1: Residential Burglaries Counted in the UCR (bp)
City 2009 2010 2011
Asheville 545 457 555
Cary 348 395 270
Charlotte 7,766 7,305 6,352
Durham 2,840 2,984 3,283
Fayetteville 3,753 3,405 3,714
Greensboro 3,766 3,487 3,279
High Point 1,126 1,032 973
Raleigh 2,488 2,442 2,364
Wilmington 1,178 1,109 1,130
Winston-Salem 3,641 3,699 3,925
We formally attend to three ambiguities that arise when these burglary num-
bers are presented as the actual number of burglaries committed (and the
derivative burglary rate per 100,000 population) in each jurisdiction: (1) the
“Hierarchy Rule” for burglaries, (2) the population estimate used in estimat-
ing the burglary rate; and (3) variation in the probability that a residential
burglary victim reports the incident to the police.
The first issue we encounter in interpreting the burglary numbers in Ta-
ble 1 is the UCR’s Hierarchy Rule (Groves and Cork, 2008:173-175; Adding-
ton, 2007). The Hierarchy Rule mandates that any residential burglary re-
ported to the police which co-occurs with an offense that ranks higher in the
UCR hierarchy (aggravated assault, robbery, rape, or murder/non-negligent
manslaughter) will not be counted as a residential burglary in the police
statistics. Because of the Hierarchy Rule, we know the number of residential
burglaries reported by the police to the UCR program, bp, will generally be
an undercount of the number of residential burglaries actually known to the
police, which we denote as bk. In order to estimate bk we need an estimate
of the following fraction:
θ =
# of Upgraded Residential Burglaries
bp
so that 1 + θ provides us with an upward adjustment to the police-reported
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counts to get an estimate of the number of burglaries known to the police:
bk = bp × (1 + θ)
Rantala (2000:7) measured crime classifications ignoring the Hierarchy Rule
from the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) compared to
crime classifications on the same criminal events using the traditional UCR
approach. This analysis was based on a detailed study of crime reports sub-
mitted by police departments covering 1,131 jurisdictions throughout the
United States in the year 1996. According to the report, the participat-
ing police agencies reported 105,852 incidents of burglary (including both
residential and commercial burglary) in the NIBR System. The number of
burglaries that would have been counted if the UCR’s Hierarchy Rule had
been applied instead was 105,305 - which implies that the shrinkage in UCR-
counted burglaries due to the Hierarchy Rule (105,852−105,305 = 547) is on
the order of θ = 547
105,305
= 0.005. An alternative analysis using more recent
NIBRS data (2001) compiled by Addington (2007:239) suggests that θ at-
tains an upper bound of 0.01. We therefore assume that θ could be anywhere
in the interval [0.005,0.01]. If our assumptions on the location and width of
the θ interval are correct, the lower bound on bk will be:
LB(bk) = bp × [1 + LB(θ)]
while the upper bound on bk is:
UB(bk) = bp × [1 + UB(θ)]
These bounds show that the number of burglaries that appear in the police
statistics slightly underestimate the number of burglaries actually known to
the police. Table 2 presents the results of estimating bounds on bk in the
10 North Carolina cities. In each of the cities in our study, estimating bk
based on θ and bp yielded only small increases in the estimated number of
residential burglaries. While the practical effect of this adjustment is small,
we include it here in case new information ever appears showing that our
estimate of θ is too low.
4 Reporting Crimes to the Police
The NCVS (and its predecessor, the NCS) is a nationally representative ro-
tating panel household survey that has been continuously conducted by the
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Table 2: Residential Burglaries Known to Police (bk)
2009 2010 2011
City LB(bk) UB(bk) LB(bk) UB(bk) LB(bk) UB(bk)
Asheville 548 550 459 462 558 561
Cary 350 351 397 399 271 273
Charlotte 7,805 7,844 7,342 7,378 6,384 6,416
Durham 2,854 2,868 2,999 3,014 3,299 3,316
Fayetteville 3,772 3,791 3,422 3,439 3,733 3,751
Greensboro 3,785 3,804 3,504 3,522 3,295 3,312
High Point 1,132 1,137 1,037 1,042 978 983
Raleigh 2,500 2,513 2,454 2,466 2,376 2,388
Wilmington 1,184 1,190 1,115 1,120 1,136 1,141
Winston-Salem 3,659 3,677 3,717 3,736 3,945 3,964
Bureau of Justice Statistics and the U.S. Census Bureau since 1973. House-
holds selected to participate in the survey remain in the sample for a 3.5
year period with interviews scheduled every 6 months for each household (al-
though approximately 1
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of the households in the survey are interviewed each
month of the year). For personal victimizations, the NCVS interviewer at-
tempts to get information from each member of the household who is at least
12 years old. For property victimizations (including residential burglary), a
designated person in the household answers all of the survey questions on
behalf of the household.
There is a large literature on the similarities and differences in crime
trends measured by the UCR and the NCVS (Groves and Cork, 2008; Lynch
and Addington, 2007) and ways in which the UCR and the NCVS can be
adjusted to better track each other (Rand and Rennison, 2002:50-51; Groves
and Cork, 2008:74). What is unclear is how closely these trends track each
other at local levels. Since the NCVS can only be deployed for these types of
comparisons in special cases and at specific times (Groves and Cork, 2008:73-
74; Lauritsen and Schaum, 2005), there is no general way to answer this
question – it is an intrinsic source of uncertainty in our understanding of
U.S. crime patterns.
In addition to asking survey respondents about victimization experiences,
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Table 3: Reporting Rates (2009-2011)
95% CL
Year RR se[RR] Lower Upper
2009 57.3 1.7 54.0 60.6
2010 58.8 1.9 55.1 62.5
2011 52.0 1.8 48.5 55.5
the NCVS interviewers ask those who experienced victimizations whether
those incidents were reported to the police (Baumer and Lauritsen, 2010;
Maltz, 1975). The police reporting rates stratified by crime type are a stan-
dard table presented in NCVS reports going back to the original administra-
tions of the NCS in 1973. In the early years of the NCS, the reporting rates
for residential burglaries were usually estimated to be in the range of 45% to
50%. In recent years, however, the reporting rates have mostly been in the
range of 50% to 59%. Generally speaking, then, reporting rates seem to have
been trending upward over time. But even as recently as 2006, the reporting
rate fell below 50% and in the most recent year of data, the reporting rate
was estimated to be 52%. Table 3 presents the residential burglary report-
ing rates (RR), estimated standard errors of those rates (se[RR]), and 95%
confidence limits for the 2009-2011 period of our study.
The reporting rate is an approximation to a critical parameter for our
study – the probability that a residential burglary victim reports that vic-
timization to the police – which we denote as pr. For the three years, we
study closely in this paper, we ignore the problem of respondents who either
did not know or did not say whether a burglary victimization was reported
to the police. We assume that each city’s pr lies within the 95% confidence
interval of the percent of residential burglaries reported to the police in each
of the three years, 2009-2011.
5 Bounding the Number of Burglaries
When researchers, police chiefs, newspaper reporters, and booksellers report
over-time changes and area differences in crimes known to the police as actual
crime levels, they are making the strong assumption that the probability of
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a crime victim reporting a victimization to the police is constant either over
time or space (or perhaps both). Let us return briefly to the Charlotte
Observer example cited earlier. That article reported that “the number of
crimes dropped by 7.1% last year.” The only way this statement could be
correct is if the reporting probability, pr, was exactly the same from one
year to the next. Since the reporting rates in Charlotte for the range of
different crimes included in the Observer ’s article are not well understood,
there is no justification for the certitude that pr stayed exactly the same from
one year to the next. Furthermore, when researchers estimate difference-
in-difference regression models or pooled cross-sectional time-series models
to study the effects of this or that intervention, social, or economic trend
on crime patterns, the complexity of the comparisons and ambiguities in
identification propagate and the analytical difficulties remain.
We think it is preferable to develop a plausible range of values for pr
for those crimes. The range should have two key features: (1) it includes
the true value of pr; and (2) it expresses the uncertainty we have about
the true value of pr. Our approach assumes that the reporting rate for
each individual city lies within the 95% confidence interval of the reporting
rate estimated by the NCVS in each year. A useful consequence of our
approach is that it will not be possible to express the incidence of residential
burglary in terms of a single number. Instead, we adopt the perspective of
Manski (1995, 2003) and argue that a range of estimates based on a weak
but credible assumption is preferable to a fragile point estimate based on a
strong and untestable assumption. Even if some would take issue with the
precise boundaries of our interval, we still believe it to be far more credible
than a constant pr assumption across cities or over time within the same city.
And a key feature of our approach is that it is easy to use the information
we present to calculate estimates based on different boundaries if there are
good reasons for doing so.
We now turn to the task of estimating the actual number of residential
burglaries in the 10 North Carolina cities in 2009-2011. We refer to this
estimand as ba where the subscript, a, means actual. What we have obtained
so far are bounds on bk which is the number of residential burglaries known
to the police, allowing for uncertainty due to the UCR Hierarchy Rule. So,
we need a way to move from the bounds on bk to bounds on ba. In a world
where pr and bk are known with certainty, we would estimate
ba =
bk
pr
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as discussed in Eck and Riccio (1979:298). For example, if a community’s
police department recorded bk = 1,000 residential burglaries in 2009 and
the probability that a residential burglary victim reports the incident to the
police is 0.573 (the 2009 NCVS-estimated reporting rate) then it follows that
the number of actual residential burglaries in 2009 would be:
ba =
bk
pr
=
1,000
0.573
= 1,745
Since neither pr nor bk is known with certainty, our approach is to place
bounds on ba. If we have θ ∈ [0.005,0.01] uncertainty due to the UCR
Hierarchy Rule, our best estimate of the lower bound of ba is to divide the
lower bound of bk by the upper bound of pr which we assume to be 0.606.
This yields a lower bound on the estimated number of residential burglaries:
LB(ba) =
LB(bk)
UB(pr)
=
1,005
0.606
= 1,658
Conversely, the upper bound estimate is attained when:
UB(ba) =
UB(bk)
LB(pr)
=
1,010
0.540
= 1,870
So, in this instance, one could adopt the certitude that pr is exactly equal
to 0.573, which would yield a point-estimated number of 1,745 residential
burglaries. By contrast, our approach is to make the following argument: (1)
based on the available evidence, if we had drawn repeated NCVS samples, we
infer that 95% of the samples would have produced an estimated reporting
rate between 54.0% and 60.6%; (2) we do not have local-area estimates of the
reporting rates for individual cities; (3) we assume that the individual cities
are within sampling error of the national estimates; (4) if our boundaries on
pr include the true value of pr and our assumptions about the Hierarchy Rule
are correct then the number of actual burglaries lies between 1,658 and 1,870;
and (5) our answer is less precise than a point estimate but our statement
summarizing the results is far more likely to be correct and does a better job
of transmitting both what we know and what we don’t know to our audience.
Applying this logic to the residential burglary data in the 10 North Car-
olina cities in 2009-2011, we estimate the bounds on the actual number of
residential burglaries (Table 4), ba. The results in Table 4 highlight some
key features of our approach. Let’s consider Charlotte as an example. From
Table 1, in 2010, we see that the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department
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Table 4: Bounds on the Actual Number of Burglaries (ba)
2009 2010 2011
City LB(ba) UB(ba) LB(ba) UB(ba) LB(ba) UB(ba)
Asheville 903 1,020 735 838 1,004 1,156
Cary 577 651 635 724 489 563
Charlotte 12,872 14,534 11,742 13,396 11,496 13,236
Durham 4,707 5,315 4,796 5,472 5,942 6,841
Fayetteville 6,221 7,024 5,473 6,244 6,722 7,739
Greensboro 6,242 7,048 5,605 6,395 5,935 6,832
High Point 1,866 2,107 1,659 1,893 1,761 2,027
Raleigh 4,124 4,656 3,925 4,478 4,279 4,926
Wilmington 1,953 2,205 1,783 2,034 2,045 2,355
Winston-Salem 6,035 6,814 5,946 6,783 7,104 8,178
reported 7,305 residential burglaries while that number dropped to 6,352
burglaries in 2011 (a 13% year-over-year decline). Yet Table 4 shows that
the actual number of residential burglaries in Charlotte in 2010 was between
11,742 and 13,396 while in 2011 it was between 11,496 and 13,221. Based
on this evidence it is not possible to definitively say whether the number of
residential burglaries stayed the same, increased, or decreased from 2010 to
2011. A critical source of ambiguity in this comparison is that the 95% con-
fidence limits for the reporting rate in 2010 and 2011 are [0.551,0.625] and
[0.485,0.555], respectively. So, it is not possible to tell whether the decline in
Charlotte burglaries reported by the police is due to real changes in burglary
or changes in the reporting rate from one year to the next (or both).
Asheville serves as a counterexample. In 2010, the Asheville Police De-
partment reported 457 residential burglaries while in 2011, the number in-
creased to 555 (a 21.4% increase). Our analysis estimates that the actual
number of residential burglaries increased from the range of [735,838] in 2010
to the range of [1004,1156] in 2011. This means that the sign of the change
in Asheville is identified (positive) even with the uncertainty that we have
allowed for the reporting rates. The bottom line of Table 4 is that sometimes
relatively strong conclusions are warranted – and sometimes they are not.
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Table 5: Population Estimates
2009 2010 2011
City ns nf ns nf ns nf
Asheville 78,267 74,923 78,804 83,393 82,846 84,450
Cary 141,269 133,757 147,282 135,234 136,203 136,949
Charlotte 738,768 777,708 752,799 779,541 776,787 789,478
Durham 221,675 227,492 227,524 228,330 222,978 231,225
Fayetteville 205,285 173,995 205,555 200,564 206,132 203,107
Greensboro 257,581 253,191 261,519 269,666 263,279 Missing
High Point 100,648 103,675 102,216 104,371 104,788 105,695
Raleigh 367,514 406,005 373,100 403,892 395,716 409,014
Wilmington 99,485 101,438 99,911 106,476 104,422 107,826
Winston-Salem 222,574 230,978 229,338 229,617 224,566 232,529
6 Population and Household Estimates
In the UCR, burglaries are defined in terms of the number of incidents per
100,000 population. The NCVS, on the other hand defines the burglary rate
in terms of the number of incidents per 1,000 households. Regardless of
which approach one adopts, it is necessary – at least as a starting point –
to have reasonable estimates of the number of persons living within a police
department’s jurisdiction (Gibbs and Erickson, 1976). Both the SBI’s and the
FBI’s UCR programs publish these estimates. We refer to the SBI estimate
as ns while the FBI’s estimate is denoted as nf .
4 Table 5 presents a summary
of the two sets of population estimates for each of the cities in each year of
our study.
In looking at the estimates in Table 5 we are struck by how similar they
are in some cases (for example, Winston-Salem and Durham in 2010) and
how different they are in others (for example, Fayetteville in 2009, and Char-
lotte and Raleigh in 2009-10). We do not take a position on the comparative
validity of the two population estimates, but the fact that they are sometimes
not close to equal adds yet another layer of uncertainty to our interpretation
of the crime rate. That there would be variation in population estimates
4The Greensboro Police Department’s 2011 data were published in the North Carolina
State Bureau of Investigation’s Crime Reporting Program but not in the FBI’s Uniform
Crime Reporting Program. Consequently, we do not have a FBI estimate of the size of
the population in the jurisdiction of the Greensboro Police Department for the year 2011.
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when those estimates are compiled by independent agencies is unsurprising.
Summarizing the size of the population or the number of households in a par-
ticular police department’s jurisdiction in a year’s time with a single number
must, on its face, be an approximation (Gibbs and Erickson, 1976). It is
also interesting that textbook discussions of the crime rate often point to
ambiguities in counting the number of crimes but the ambiguities of count-
ing the target population for any particular crime rate are a less prominent
consideration (Lab et al. 2008:4-5).
A second issue is the calibration of household counts within a particular
city. One could take the position of the NCVS, that residential burglary is
a crime against an entire household and that residential burglaries are best
expressed in terms of the risk per household rather than an individual per-
person (or a scaled-up divisor such as 1,000 persons or 100,000 persons). A
question that needs to be considered in any specific analysis is whether the
conclusions we draw depend on the scaling unit. It is useful to consider the
polar case where the scaling unit would not create any ambiguity. If we are
able to assume that the number of persons per household is constant over
time within the same city and across cities, then the choice between scaling
units (persons or households) is arbitrary. On the other hand, if the number
of persons per household varies over time within a jurisdiction or between
jurisdictions, then our rate estimators should accomodate this variability.
Table 6 relies on the data in Table 5 combined with information from the
U.S. Census Bureau’s (2012) measure of the average number of persons per
household (pph) in each of the 10 North Carolina cities over the period 2006-
2010 to produce state and federal estimates of the number of households in
each city (hs and hf , respectively).
A prominent aspect of the evidence in Table 6 is that there is real varia-
tion in the number of persons per household in large North Carolina cities.
On average, Asheville and Wilmington have smaller household sizes (< 2.2
persons per household) while Cary and High Point have the highest density
households (> 2.5 persons per household). It is possible, then, that two
cities could have an identical rate of residential burglary when that rate is
expressed in terms of population size but have different residential burglary
rates when expressed in terms of the number of households in the city.
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Table 6: Household Estimates
2009 2010 2011
City pph hs hf hs hf hs hf
Asheville 2.13 36,745 35,175 36,997 39,152 38,895 39,648
Cary 2.68 52,712 49,909 54,956 50,460 50,822 51,100
Charlotte 2.46 300,312 316,141 306,016 316,887 315,767 320,926
Durham 2.30 96,380 98,910 98,923 99,274 96,947 100,533
Fayetteville 2.48 82,776 70,159 82,885 80,873 83,118 81,898
Greensboro 2.34 110,077 108,201 111,760 115,242 112,512 Missing
High Point 2.51 40,099 41,305 40,724 41,582 41,748 42,110
Raleigh 2.35 156,389 172,768 158,766 171,869 168,390 174,049
Wilmington 2.19 45,427 46,319 45,621 48,619 47,681 49,236
Winston-Salem 2.42 91,973 95,445 94,768 94,883 92,796 96,086
7 Estimating Residential Burglary Rates
We now consider how much our inferences about residential burglary rates
depend upon the issues we have considered in this paper. We don’t expect
much sensitivity to the uncertainty of the Hierarchy Rule since the adjust-
ments are small. It is less clear how sensitive our results will be to uncertainty
about the size of the population (including whether we scale by the number
of persons or the number of households) and uncertainty about the fraction
of residential burglaries reported to the police.
In order to estimate the actual rate of residential burglaries per 100,000
persons (ra), we define its lower bound as:
LB(ra) =
LB(ba)
max(ns,nf )
× 100,000
while the upper bound is:
UB(ra) =
UB(ba)
min(ns,nf )
× 100,000
This interval estimate identifies the outer limits of what is possible in terms
of the residential burglary rate per 100,000 persons assuming that ns and
nf form the proper bounds on the size of the population, that each city’s
reporting rate falls within the 95% confidence interval of the NCVS-estimated
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reporting rate, and that our adjustments for the FBI’s Hierarchy Rule are
accurate. We combine these estimates with the standard residential burglary
rates per 100,000 population based on the information from Tables 1 and 5
to produce the point and interval estimates in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Residential Burglary Rate (Population) Estimates
For each of the 10 cities in Figure 1 there are 2 sets of estimates: (1) the
upper and lower bound (interval) estimates of the actual residential burglary
rate (ra) for 2009-2011; and (2) the “standard” (point) estimates of the res-
idential burglary rate per 100,000 population (based on Tables 1 and 5) for
2009-2011.5 Comparisons between the point estimates over time within the
same city implicitly assume that the reporting rate, pr is the same across the
years while comparisons between point estimates of different cities implicitly
assume that the reporting rate is constant between the cities being compared
(at the time they are compared). While these assumptions seem implausi-
bly strong, they are commonly invoked for both journalistic and research
purposes.
We also consider the impact of adjusting for the number of households
instead of the number of people and then placing residential burglaries on
a scale per 1,000 households in each city during each year (Figure 2). This
5We remind the reader that Greensboro’s analysis for 2011 is incomplete since the FBI
did not publish population estimates for that city in that year.
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Figure 2: Residential Burglary Rate (Household) Estimates
analysis relies on the information presented in Tables 4 and 6. To estimate
the lower bound on the residential burglary rate per 1,000 households we
obtain:
LB(ra) =
LB(ba)
max(hs,hf )
× 1,000
and the upper bound is given by:
UB(ra) =
UB(ba)
min(hs,hf )
× 1,000
Broadly speaking, the two sets of rate comparisons in Figures 1 and 2 seem
to tell similar stories. From this analysis, our major conclusion is that the
major source of uncertainty in estimating residential burglary rates in these
10 North Carolina cities over the 2009-2011 time frame is the reporting rate,
and to a lesser extent, the size of the population.
It is worth considering a couple of example implications of our results.
Suppose we set out to compare the burglary rates between Charlotte and
Wilmington in 2009. Using the standard approach for comparing the two
cities, we would find that Charlotte had a residential burglary rate of 1,051
per 100,000 persons while Wilmington’s rate is 1,184 (nearly 13% higher).
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Some might use this evidence to say that Wilmington had a higher residen-
tial burglary rate than Charlotte in 2009. But upon further analysis, we find
that the actual rate of residential burglaries per 100,000 population could
plausibly lie in the [1656,1967] interval in Charlotte and the [1925,2216] in-
terval in Wilmington. Since these intervals overlap (see Figure 1), the sign
of the difference between Charlotte and Wilmington is not identified.
This lack of identifiability becomes even more prominent when we focus on
household incidence of burglary. For Charlotte, the bounds on the residential
burglary rate per 1,000 households in 2009 are [40.72,48.40]; for Wilmington,
the bounds are [42.16,48.53]. This is a marked increase in the degree of
overlap between the Charlotte and Wilmington interval estimates. We can
attribute most of this difference to the fact that Charlotte households had
an average of 2.46 persons in 2006-2010 while Wilmington households were
smaller on average (2.19 persons) over the same time period. In short, to
speak about a clear difference in these two cities is an example of unwarranted
certitude. It is possible that Charlotte’s burglary rate is higher, lower, or the
same as Wilmington’s. Considering plausible sources of uncertainty in the
comparison, the data are simply not strong enough to tell us.
A comparison of Charlotte and Raleigh – on the other hand – leads us
to a stronger set of conclusions. In 2011, for example, Charlotte’s estimated
residential burglary rate per 100,000 population – based exclusively on the
information in Tables 1 and 5 – was 818 while Raleigh’s rate was 597 (a
818−597
818
× 100 ≈ 27% difference). We conclude that the difference between
the burglary rates in Charlotte and Raleigh cannot be explained by the un-
certainties considered in this paper. The residential burglary rate interval
for Charlotte in 2011 is [1456,1704] while the interval for Raleigh in the same
year is [1046,1245]. As Figure 2 shows, there is a similar pattern for bur-
glary incidence scaled by the number of households. Since these intervals do
not overlap, it seems credible to argue that Charlotte’s rate is higher than
Raleigh’s rate in 2011.6
Figures 1 and 2 are also helpful for displaying the over-time change within
cities. Using the standard crime rate estimator, we can see that the point
estimates of Charlotte’s residential burglary rate reveal what appears to
6We leave aside the question of why Charlotte’s rate is higher than Raleigh’s rate.
There are a large number of possibilities. What we have been able to establish with this
analysis is that the difference between the two cities cannot be explained by uncertainty
in the population size and sampling variation in the NCVS reporting rate. Thus, the
explanation(s) for the difference between the cities lies elsewhere.
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be a meaningful decline from 2009 (1,051) to 2011 (818) (a drop of about
818−1,051
1,051
× 100 ≈ 22.2%). The problem is that there is some evidence that
reporting rates could have also changed a good deal over the same time
period. What this means is that the burglary rate interval for Charlotte
(accounting for the Hierarchy Rule, reporting rate uncertainty, and popula-
tion size uncertainty) is [1655,1967] in 2009 and [1456,1704] in 2011. Since
these intervals overlap we cannot discern whether the Charlotte burglary rate
increased, decreased, or stayed the same over this time period. A counterex-
ample is provided by Durham. In 2009, the standard burglary rate estimate
was 1,281; in 2011 that rate estimate increased to 1,472 – an increase of
1,472−1,281
1,281
× 100 ≈ 14.9%. Our interval estimates suggest that this increase
was real; in 2009, the interval was [2069,2398] while in 2011, the entire in-
terval shifted up to [2570,3068]. In the case of Durham, we can confidently
conclude that residential burglaries increased – why that increase occurred,
of course, is a different question.
8 Conclusions
A good deal of contemporary discussion about local crime patterns in the U.S.
is marred by unwarranted certitude about the numbers and rates underlying
that discussion. Criminal justice officials, journalists, and even academic
criminologists count crimes known to the police while ignoring key sources
of uncertainty about those numbers. Since the late 1960’s and early 1970’s,
for example, it has been common criminological knowledge that many crimes
are not reported to the police but somehow that knowledge ends up playing
only a tangential role (if any role at all) in our public discourse about crime
patterns at the local level.
Part of the problem is that there has been little methodological attention
to the task of expressing and transmitting uncertainty about crime patterns
to policy and lay audiences (Manski, 2003:21). Based on Manski’s work on
bounds and partial identification, however, we think it will be useful for crim-
inologists to begin reporting crime patterns in terms of a range of uncertainty
that expresses both what is known and unknown about the numbers that are
used to measure those patterns. A key feature of the methods used here is
that they explicitly abandon the goal of obtaining point estimates in favor
of a more realistic and reasonable goal of obtaining interval estimates. Our
approach provides one path by which criminologists can begin to reasonably
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express both what is known and unknown with current publicly available
datasets.
Another feature of our approach is that we move away from the “incredi-
ble certitude” problem described by Charles Manski (2011) – the practice of
developing unqualified and unjustifiably “certain” inferences based on weak
data. Criminologists are often asked by the media to comment on small year-
to-year movements in police-based crime statistics. In our conversations with
other criminologists, we have noted that many feel quite uncomfortable char-
acterizing this or that small movement in the crime rate. The analysis in this
paper illustrates why these feelings of apprehension are justified. As Eck and
Riccio (1979) observed over 30 years ago, a movement of a few percentage
points in the police statistics may or may not reflect real changes in crime.
We think our approach to this problem is useful because it allows us to trans-
mit our uncertainty – especially to lay audiences – in systematic ways that
have not been obvious in the past.
Still, there are limitations. First and foremost, we believe our bounds on
the probability that a residential burglary is reported to the police (pr) are
a reasonable starting point but improving our understanding of this inter-
val would be constructive. This highlights an important direction for future
research: achieving disciplinary consensus on the likely bounds for crime re-
porting probabilities should be a high priority. One reviewer of a previous
version of this manuscript criticized our reporting rate intervals as being too
narrow. That reviewer found it inconceivable that the local and national
estimates would exhibit any particular comparability. Most of the data that
can be used to check on this were collected in the 1970’s in a series of city
crime surveys conducted by the National Criminal Justice Information and
Statistics Service (1974, 1975, 1976; see also Levitt, 1998) and a research re-
port by Lauritsen and Schaum (2005). While there is not much local data to
go on, it appears from the weight of this evidence that most cities have resi-
dential burglary reporting rates that are within a reasonably proximate range
of the national estimates of their time. The reviewer’s comment nonetheless
highlights the need for greater understanding of how closely local reporting
rates track what is observed nationally. And – if the reviewer turns out to
be correct – then the burglary rate intervals estimated in our work will be
too narrow; a result which amplifies rather than diminishes our arguments.
We have considered several examples where point estimates based on
conventional methods prove to be highly misleading. Using those methods
one would draw the conclusion that one city had a higher rate than another
22
city or that a city’s rate changed in a meaningful way from one year compared
to another. Our analysis shows that in some of these comparisons, a plausible
rival hypothesis cannot be excluded: it is possible that the burglary rates are
the same while only the reporting rate differs. Since the reporting rate, pr,
is not identified – we can only make assumptions about its value – the data
cannot be used to resolve this ambiguity. Only information that reduces our
uncertainty about the rate at which residential burglaries are reported to the
police in the two cities will resolve it.
The good news is that the development of this kind of information is
feasible. The National Research Council along with the BJS has recently
considered a range of possibilities for improving on the small-area estimation
capabilities of the NCVS (Groves and Cork, 2008; Bureau of Justice Statis-
tics, 2010). Most of the attention has focused on small-area estimation of
victimization rates but further refinement of reporting rate estimates should
also be a priority. This is not a new idea – Eck and Riccio (1979) emphasized
the possibilities of this approach decades ago – yet combining this emphasis
with a focus on interval estimation of crime rates may prove to be a viable
way forward. A key benefit of this kind of information would be a substantial
reduction of the uncertainty that is evident in our Figures 1-2.
It it noteworthy that we are able to make useful statements about resi-
dential burglary rates for North Carolina cities because the state reporting
program clearly identifies residential burglaries known to the police. This is
not done in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Report which presents counts of all
burglaries – both residential and commercial – known to the police in a sin-
gle number. And we encounter difficulty using the FBI’s burglary numbers
since the NCVS only measures reporting behaviors for residential burglaries.
Expansion of our approach to other crimes will require careful considera-
tion of how the crimes described in the UCR relate to the victimization
incidents counted in the NCVS. There is a well-developed literature on this
topic (see, for example, Blumstein et al., 1991, 1992; Lynch and Adding-
ton, 2007) but there will be some difficulties in ensuring that the reporting
probability gleaned from the NCVS maps onto UCR crime categories in a
meaningful way. In our view, the field will be well served by taking on these
challenges.
We encountered a few other ambiguities in addition to the reporting prob-
ability; namely, uncertainty due to the UCR’s Hierarchy Rule, the size of the
population and the question of whether to scale by the number of households
or by the number of person (Gibbs and Erickson, 1976). It is surprising how
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large some of the differences in population estimates were and this uncer-
tainty should be considered in more detail. We verified that each of the
jurisdictions we studied participated in the state Uniform Crime Report-
ing Program each month of each year during the 2009-2011 calendar years
(but Greensboro did not participate in the federal program in 2011); still we
clearly have no way to verify the accuracy of the numbers reported by the
police departments (Westat, 2010:VII-VIII). This issue is always a threat
to analyses that rely on police-based crime statistics and our study is no
exception.
In our view, it will be useful for criminologists to: (1) be aware of the
kinds of uncertainties discussed in this paper; (2) develop better informa-
tion about uncertain parameters – such as the probability of victimizations
being reported to the police at the local level; (3) create analytic methods
that will formally incorporate and transmit key sources of uncertainty in the
measurement of crime rates; and (4) explore ways of conducting sensitivity
analysis to assess the fragility of our results. A fifth priority should be a
program of research to consider how identification problems such as those
discussed in this paper can be addressed within the framework of statistical
models commonly used to estimate effects of social and economic changes
on crime rates. Logically, there is no difference between a comparison of
burglary rates in Charlotte and Raleigh from 2009 to 2010 and the kinds of
panel regresssion, difference-in-difference, and pooled-cross-sectional time se-
ries estimators commonly used to identify causal relationships in crime data.
All of the uncertainties discussed here are present in space-and-time crime
regressions commonly estimated by criminologists. Yet the issues discussed
in this paper loom as major sources of uncertainty for these models. We view
our approach as an initial, constructive, and necessary step in the direction
of a more balanced and informative use of aggregate crime statistics.
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